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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 890120 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered in favor 
of Defendant/Appellee Rex Jackson, dated January 30, 1989 and 
from a Summary Judgment entered in favor of Defendants/Appellees 
Southgate Golf Course, John LaGant and John Willie, dated March 
22, 1989. To the extent necessary, both Summary Judgments have 
been certified final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Statutory jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court 
because this is an appeal from the judgment of a district court 
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2 (3) (j) ; 78-2a-3 (Supp. 
1989) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in determining that Jackson, 
LaGant and Willie were vendors of the golf course and, therefore, 
were not liable as a matter of law for defects in their design or 
construction of the golf course which existed as of the date of 
its sale to Southgate? 
2. Did the lower court err in dismissing the action against 
Jackson, LaGant and Willie as being time barred under the statute 
of limitations, when said individuals had failed to properly 
raise the defense of the statute of limitations as required under 
Pules 9(h) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
3. Is Section 78-12-25.5 as applied in this case 
unconstitutional under Article If Section 11 of the Constitution 
of Utah? 
4. Is Section 78-12-25.5 as applied in this case 
unconstitutional under Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution 
of Utah or unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection under 
Amendment 14 of the Constitution of the United States of America? 
5. Did the lower court err in determining that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Southgate knew or 
should have known of any defect in the subject golf course? 
6. Did the lower court err in determining that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact as to Southgate!s negligence as to 
any of the other particulars alleged in the Second Amended 
Complaint? 
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TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
1. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall 
set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, 
arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, discharge and bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, 
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by 
fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res 
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, 
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance 
or affirmative defense. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8 (c) . 
2. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not 
necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it 
may be alleged generally that the cause of action is 
barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, 
referring to or describing such statutes specifically 
and definitely by section number, subsection 
designation, if any, or otherwise designating the 
provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify 
it. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 9 (h) . 
3. A party waives all defenses and objections which he 
does not present either by motion as hereinbefore 
provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or 
reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense 
of failure to join an indispensable party, and the 
objection of failure to state legal defense to a claim 
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is 
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings 
or at the trial on the merits and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the 
subject-matter, the court shall dismiss the action. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). 
4. (1) (a) An action to recover damages for any injury 
to property, real or personal, or for any injury to the 
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising 
out of the defective and unsafe condition of an 
improvement to real property, or any action for damages 
sustained on account of the injury, may not be brought 
against any person performing or furnishing the design, 
planning, surveying, supervising the construction of, 
or constructing the improvement to real property more 
than seven years after the completion of construction. 
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(2) The time limitation imposed by this section 
does not apply to any person in actual possession and 
control as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of the 
improvement at the time the defective and unsafe 
condition of the improvement constitutes the proximate 
cause of the injury for which an action is brought. 
(3) This section does not extend or limit the 
periods otherwise prescribed by state law for the 
brining of any action. 
(4) As used in this section: 
(a) "Person" means an individual, 
corporation, partnership, or other legal entity. 
(b) "Completion of construction" means the 
date of issuance of a certificate of substantial 
completion by the owner, architect, engineer, or 
other agent, or the date of the owner's use or 
possession of the improvement on real property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (Supp. 1989). 
5. All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
Utah Const, art I, § 11. 
6. "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." Utah Const, art I, § 24. 
7. All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 5, 1986, while golfing at Southgate Golf Course in 
St. George, Utah, Plaintiff was struck in the face and personally 
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injured by an errant golf ball hit by Defendant Ike Thomas 
(hereinafter "Thomas"). Second Amended Complaint 1 10. (R. vol. 
I, pp. 302-03; Addendum [hereinafter "A."] 2-3). 
Plaintiff brought this action against Thomas claiming he was 
negligent in causing the ball to strike Plaintiff. Further, 
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Southgate Golf Course 
(hereinafter "Southgate"), the owner and operator of the golf 
course where the incident occurred, was negligent in failing to 
erect an appropriate barrier that would have prevented the ball 
from striking Plaintiff, in failing to warn Plaintiff and other 
golf course patrons of the danger posed by the configuration of 
the golf course and for failing to take other appropriate 
precautions for the safety of Plaintiff and others. Finally, 
Plaintiff named the previous owner and operator of the golf 
course, Lava Hills Resort Corporation (hereinafter "Lava Hills") 
and Rex Jackson, John LaGant and John Willie (hereinafter, 
respectively, "Jackson," "LaGant," and "Willie"), three former 
shareholders and principals of Lava Hills, who performed or 
participated in the design and construction of the golf course. 
Id., M 12-15 (R. vol. I, pp. 303-04; A. 3-4). 
Plaintiff claimed that Lava Hills and Jackson, LaGant and 
Willie were negligent in failing to safely design the golf course 
to prevent injury to Plaintiff and others, that they were 
negligent in failing to safely construct the golf course so as to 
prevent injury to Plaintiff and others and, finally that they 
were negligent in failing to inform Southgate and any other 
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successors in interest of any latent defects they knew or should 
have known existed at the golf course that could cause injury to 
Plaintiff and others. Id,, tt 16-17 (R. vol, I, p. 304; A. 4), 
Plaintiff settled her claims against Thomas and, therefore, 
he is not a party to this appeal. Furthermore, Lava Hills has 
been dissolved and, therefore, is not an active party to this 
action or this appeal. Summary Judgment dated March 22, 1989, M 
5-6 (R. vol. II, pp. 276-66; A. 64-65). 
On January 30, 1989, after hearing oral argument, the 
district court entered Summary Judgment in favor of Jackson on 
the grounds that Jackson was a vendor of the golf course and was 
not subject to liability as of the date the vendee, Southgate, 
took possession of it. Summary Judgment dated January 30, 1989 
(R. vol. II, pp. 215-16; A. 55-56); Order Granting Defendant Rex 
Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment; Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (hereinafter "Findings") , Conclusions of Law, 
M 1-3 (R. vol. II, pp. 212-13; A. 52-53). 
On March 22, 1989, after hearing oral argument, the district 
court denied a Motion to Vacate the Summary Judgment in favor of 
Jackson on the additional ground that said action was not timely 
under the statute of limitations and further granted Summary 
Judgment in favor of LaGant and Willie on the same grounds. 
Also, the Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of Southgate on 
the grounds that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that 
Southgate knew or should have known of any defect in the golf 
course and was negligent. Conclusions of Law Underlying Summary 
Judgment (R. vol. II, pp. 270-73; A. 58-61). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 5, 1986, Plaintiff was golfing at Southgate Golf 
Course in St. Georgef Utah. At approximately 12:15 p.m. that day 
she was standing on the tee-box of the 15th hole of the golf 
course waiting her turn to make her first shot from the tee. 
While standing in that area, Thomas, who was making his first 
shot from the tee area of the 14th hole, caused the ball to 
deviate from its straight path and fly to the right (slice) and 
strike Plaintiff in the face where she was standing. The tee 
boxes of the 14th and 15th holes were designed and constructed 
such that Plaintiff would have been standing approximately 50 to 
7 5 yards in front of and to the right of where Thomas struck the 
ball. Second Amended Complaint M 8-10 (R. vol. I, pp. 302; A. 
2); Findings <l 1 (R. vol. II, pp. 209-10; A. 49-50). 
At the time of the accident, the golf course was owned art 
operated by Southgate. Southgate had purchased the golf course 
some 11 months earlier from Lava Hills. Second Amended 
Complaint, TL 8 (R. vol. I, p. 302; A. 2); Findings, $5 2-3 (R. 
vol. II, pp. 209-210; A. 49-50). 
After taking possession of the golf course, but prior to the 
accident that is the subject of this action, Southgate redesigned 
and modified the 14th hole of the golf course by moving the green 
some 130 feet closer to the tee and to the left of the previous 
green location. Southgate made no change to the design of the 
15th hole. Second Amended Complaint f 9 (R. vol. I, p. 302; A. 
2); Findings, f 5 (R. vol. II, 210; A. 50). 
7 
Jackson, LaGant and Willie were involved in the initial 
design and construction of the golf course in the spring and 
summer of 1975. Willie was the primary designer of the course, 
with the assistance of LaGant. In its original design, it was 
intended that there would be a natural barrier (trees) between 
the 14th and 15th tees. Jackson, who supervised the actual 
construction of the golf course, failed to install the trees. 
Affidavit of John Willie (hereinafter "Willie Affidavit") 15 5-6, 
8-9, 12-14 (R. vol. I, pp. 260-61; A. 14-15). 
After designing and constructing the golf course, Jackson, 
LaGant and Willie all eventually ceased active association with 
its operation. After construction was completed, Jackson and 
Willie maintained only a shareholder's interest in Lava Hills 
until the golf course was sold to Southgate. LaGant sold his 
entire interest in December 1984, prior to the sale. Willie 
Affidavit f 4 (R. vol. I, p. 260; A. 14); Affidavit of Rex 
Jackson, f 3 (R. vol. I, p. 216; A. 20); Affidavit of John LaGant 
t 4 (R. vol. II, p. 75; A. 11). 
Plaintiff's expert, David Rainville, a golf course architect 
from Orange County, California, has expressed his opinion, by 
affidavit, that the golf course was defective in design and 
construction in that there was no natural or artificial barrier 
between the 14th and 15th holes. He stated that such defective 
condition still existed on April 5, 1986, after the modifications 
by Southgate. Affidavit of David A. Rainville 1 11 & Exhibit L 
(R. vol. I, pp. 116-117, 131; A. 33, 38-39). 
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Two principals of Southgate, Richard Schmutz and William 
Atkinf by affidavit in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, first state that there is no defect in the design or 
construction of the golf course. Then, both state that both the 
layout and the proximity and location of the two tee boxes was 
patent and easily observable by any patron of the golf course, 
including Plaintiff. Finally, in its Findings of Fact in Support 
of the Summary Judgment in Favor of Jackson, the Court finds that 
if there is a defect in the course, "such defect could have been 
discovered by Defendant Southgate through such an inspection as 
would be made in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, and 
Defendant Southgate had a reasonable time to discover and remedy 
any such defect or dangerous condition prior to the occurrence of 
Plaintiff's accident." Affidavit of Richard Schmutz in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Schmutz Affidavit") , 
i5 8-9 (R, vol. I, p. 81; A. 25); Affidavit of William Atkin in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Atkin 
Affidavit" 55 7-8) (Supplemental Record; A. 29). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1: Jackson, LaGant and Willie are, or should be 
excepted from the rule stated in Preston v. Golden, The are not 
vendors, they are commercial developers, and they performed the 
actual construction of the course. Further, they should remain 
liable at least a reasonable time after the sale. Such 
reasonable time is a genuine issue of material fact. 
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POINT II; Jackson, LaGant and Willie have not properly 
raised the defense of the statute of limitations under Rules 8(c) 
and 9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, 
such a defense is waived under Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
POINT III; Assuming Jackson, LaGant or Willie have properly 
raised the statute of limitations defense, Section 78-12-25.5 is 
unconstitutional under the Open Courts Provision of the Utah 
Constitution. Based upon the reasoning in Berry ex rel Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., there is not a reasonable justification for 
denying Plaintiff and others similarly situated from a remedy 
against the persons who may have created the defects in the golf 
course that ultimately caused her injury. 
POINT IV; Section 75-12-25.5 is an unconstitutional denial 
of equal protection as applied to Plaintiff and others similarly 
situated in her class under Article I Section 2 4 of the Utah 
Constitution and Amendment 14 of the United States Constitution. 
Under the doctrine set forth in Malan v. Lewis and Condemarin v. 
University of Utah, there is no justifiable or reasonable basis 
for denying Plaintiff and the other persons similarly situated 
from bringing a cause of action because the wrongful conduct 
giving rise to the cause of action occurred more than seven years 
prior to the injury. 
POINT V; The Affidavits of Richard Schmutz and William 
Atkin, along with the Finding of Fact in connection with the 
Summary Judgment in favor of Jackson and the Affidavit of 
10 
Plaintiff's expert, all raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether there was a latent defect in the golf course, which 
caused injury to Plaintiff, and whether Southgate knew or should 
have known such defect existed. 
POINT VI; Even assuming the lower court was correct in 
determining, as a matter of law, that any defect in the golf 
course was latent, there is still a question of fact regarding 
whether Southgate was negligent in creating the defect. 
Plaintiff's expert has testified that the golf course as actually 
modified by Southgate, was still defective in its design and 
construction. Therefore, there is still as issue of fact as to 
whether Southgate was affirmatively negligent in its design 
and/or construction of the modification of the 14th hole. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PRESTON V. GOLDMAN, IF APPLICABLE, IS 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THIS CASE 
The Court below determined that under the case of Preston v. 
Goldman, 42 Cal. 3d 108, 720 P.2d 476 (1986), Jackson, LaGant and 
V7illie, as vendors of the golf course in May of 1985, were not 
liable for any defects in the design and/or construction of the 
course from the date Southgate took over possession and control 
of it after its purchase of the golf course. 
In Preston, a child was severly injured from a near drowning 
in a pond constructed on certain residential property. The 
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child's father brought a lawsuit against both the present owners 
of the property and the previous owners who had designed and 
constructed the pond. After trial, the lower court entered 
judgment on a special verdict in favor of all defendants. On 
appeal to the California Court of Appeals, plaintiff argued that 
the court had failed to properly instruct the jury on the basis 
for liability of the previous owner. The California Court of 
Appeals reversed upon that basis, but the California Supreme 
Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that liability in a 
landowner liability case was predicated on ownership and control 
of the property regardless of whether the previous owner had 
created a dangerous condition. 
The California court made a number of exceptions to its 
holding. First, the California court stated: "Our holding here 
relates only to the liability of 'do-it-yourself1 home improvers 
and is not intended to effect, establish, or diminish any 
liability of commercial builders, contractors or renovators." 
Id. 720 P.2d at 487 n.10. 
Second, the court recognized that when the prior landowner 
was the contractor or builder of the entire property, there are 
different rules that apply that may hold such professional 
developer/owner liable even after he has sold the property. Id., 
720 P.2d at 481 n.3. 
Finally, the California court discussed, but rejected, an 
exception that would permit a previous landowner's liability to 
continue even after the date of purchase until a subsequent 
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landowner could reasonably discover a hazardous defect in the 
property and take appropriate precautions to remedy itf 
especially if the previous landowner had created the condition. 
Id. 720 P.2d at 478 n.2, 480. 
The facts of the instant case fall under all of the 
exceptions outlined in Preston. Furthermoref because of Utah law 
regarding latent defects, this Court should not follow Preston 
orr at least should adopt the third exception rejected by 
Preston. 
A. Commercial Builders Contractors or Renovators 
In the first exception, the Preston court specifically 
excludes from its holding any effect upon the liability of 
"commercial builders, contractors or renovators." Id., 720 P. 2d 
at 487 n.10. It appears that the reason for this exception would 
be to discourage a contractor or builder from substandard 
performance when he knows that after his work is completed the 
property will be conveyed to a new owner and the contractor or 
builder would be insulated from liability. The California court 
instead limits its holding to improvements made by 
"do-it-yourselfers." In other words, one must actually have 
owned the property when the improvements were made, made the 
improvements himself and then sold it to a third party prior to 
the injury in order to be insulated from liability under Preston. 
In this case, Lava Hills was the owner of the golf course at 
the time it was initially designed and constructed and at the 
time it was sold to Southgate. Although Jackson, LaGant and 
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Willie were officers and shareholders^e/f Lava Hills at various 
times, they were never, as individuals, owners. Indeed, LaGant 
apparently did not even have an equity interest in Lava Hills at 
the time the golf course was sold to Southgate. Also, both 
Jackson and Willie, although they apparently still held stock in 
Lava Hills, no longer had any supervisory control over that 
corporation. Thus, it appears that only Lava Hills might 
possibly be excepted from liability under the Preston rule. 
B. Owner/Developer 
Even assuming that Jackson, LaGant and Willie were the 
vendors of the golf course at the time it was sold to Southgate, 
the second exception under Preston applies because they were 
owners/developers who, previous to conveying the golf course to 
Southgate, had fully designed, constructed and developed the 
property. Under this exception, more emphasis is placed upon the 
landowner's role as the creator of the dangerous condition and he 
is found to be liable despite his subsequent sale of the 
property. 
This Court apparently applied this exception in Loveland v. 
Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987) . There, the purchasers 
of a home brought an action against the city, the irrigation 
company and the developer of the subdivision for failing to 
design and construct a fence or other barrier over a canal in 
which the plaintiffs' child drowned shortly after the plaintiffs 
purchased the property from the developer's successor in 
interest, Jacor. The lower court granted summary judgment in 
14 
favor of all defendants and this Court affirmed, holding, inter 
alia, that the developer had no duty to disclose any dangers in 
the canal to Jacor or plaintiffs. This Court based its decision 
upon Section 352 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was 
the primary basis for the Preston decision. This Court then 
stated: 
The Lovelands contend that they did not sue Brown 
Brothers in its capacity as a vendor of lot sixteen, 
but rather as the developer of the property. Brown 
Brothers, without authority, claims that this 
distinction is of no legal consequence. We disagree. 
Although^£here has been no wholesale importation of the 
princip^a^^underlying products liability into the real 
estate context, some exceptions have arisen where the 
prior landowner was a professional developer. 
Id. at 768 (citing Preston v. Goldman, 42 Cal. 3d 108, 117 n.3, 
720 P.2d 476, 481 n.3 (1986)). 
Although this case did not involve the development of a 
subdivision as in Loveland, since Jackson, LaGant and Willie 
developed the property, the same exception outlined in Preston 
and Loveland should apply to them despite Plaintiff's lack of 
privity with them. 
Before leaving Loveland, this Court should note two other 
exceptions to the vendor non-liability rule touched upon in 
Preston and discussed at some length in Loveland. Those 
exceptions, set forth in Section 353 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts are set forth in Loveland as follows: 
The first exception involves a vendor!s duty to 
disclose to the vendee any concealed conditions known 
to the vendor which involve an unreasonable danger. 
The second exception is that a vendor owes a duty for a 
reasonable time to those outside the land who are 
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injured after the sale by a dangerous condition on the 
land. 
Loveland, 746 P. 2d at 768 (emphasis in original) (footnotes 
omitted) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 353, 373 
(1965)) . 
Regarding the first Loveland exception, there is at least an 
issue of fact (although admittedly none of the parties have 
presented affidavits or other sworn testimony addressing this 
issue, Plaintiff has raised it as an allegation in her Complaint) 
as to whether Jackson, LaGant and/or Willie failed to properly 
disclose a concealed defect in the golf course to Southgate at 
the time of sale. 
C. Reasonably Extended Liability 
The second exception in Loveland is similar to the third 
exception that was rejected in Preston; that is, that the vendor 
should continue to be liable to third parties who come onto the 
land until the vendee has had a reasonable time to discover and 
correct the dangerous condition. This exception has been 
supported in Cogliati v. Ecco High Frequency Corp.f 9 2 N.J. 40 2, 
456 A.2d 524f 531 (1983). The New York Supreme Court has carried 
this exception a step further by determining that there is always 
liability to a prior owner who commits affirmative acts of 
negligence by creating the dangerous condition. Merrick v. 
Murphy, 83 Misc. 2d 39, 371 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1975) . 
In the instant case, there is clearly an issue of fact as to 
whether a reasonable time has passed to enable Southgate to 
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correct any defect created by Jacksonf LaGant and/or Willie. 
Further, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Jackson, LaGant and/or Willie created the dangerous condition, if 
this Court were to adopt the New York rule under Merrick. 
As will be explained in Point V, and based upon the lower 
Court's ruling to that effect, Southgate is not liable for any 
defect or dangerous condition that it neither knew nor should 
have known existed at the golf course at the time Southgate took 
possession and control of it. Consequently, unless Plaintiff 
were allowed to maintain a cause of action against the persons 
who actually created the dangerous condition, in spite of their 
vendor status, she would be effectively denied a remedy. 
Because the facts of this case fall under one or more of the 
exceptions outlined in Preston, which have been or should be 
followed by this Court, Plaintiff should be entitled to maintain 
her claim against Jackson, LaGant and Willie, despite their 
possible status as vendors. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE JACKSON, WILLIE AND LAGANT HAVE FAILED TO 
PROPERLY RAISE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THEIR 
ANSWERS, SUCH DEFENSE IS WAIVED 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
the affirmative defense of statute of limitations must be raised 
in the responsive pleading, in this case, the answer. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 8(c). Further, Rule 9(h) states that the defense of 
statute of limitation must be raised with some particularity by 
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specifying the particular section, subsection and/or particular 
provision relied upon. Id., 9(h). 
It is undisputed that none of the Answers filed by Jacksonf 
LaGant or Willie raise the affirmative defense of the statute of 
limitations, much less specifically identify Section 
78-12-25.5—upon which the court relied in its Summary 
Judgment—with any particularity. 
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that unless a defense, such as the statute of limitations
 f is 
raised by an initial motion or in the responsive pleading 
(answer) such a defense is waived. Id., 12(h). This Court has 
applied that rule most recently in Staker v. Huntington Cleveland 
Irrigation Co.f 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983),. There, a plaintiff 
brought an action to recover reimbursement of excessive water 
fees he had paid to the defendant water company. On the morning 
of trial, the defendant sought to amend its answer to claim that 
plaintiff's claim was barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. The lower court denied the motion and ultimately 
granted judgment for plaintiff. This Court affirmed the denial 
of the motion to amend the answer, stating that ff[t]he statute of 
limitations defense must be pleaded as an affirmative defense in 
the responsive pleading, or it is waived, Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) 
and 12(h), unless an amended pleading asserting the defense is 
allowed pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a)." See also 
Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2nd 70, 465 P.2d 1007, 
1010-11 (1970). Cf. , Creekview Apartments v. State Farm 
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Insurance Co., 771 P.2d 693, 694-95 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(insurance policy "statute of limitations" is waived because it 
was not contained in a responsive pleading)! . 
Based upon Rule 12(h) as construed in S taker and others, 
Jackson, LaGant and Willie waived the statute of limitations 
defense and the lower Court improperly granted Summary Judgment 
on the basis of the statute of limitations^ 
POINT III 
SECTION 78-12-25.5 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE 
UTAH OPEN COURTS PROVISION 
If this Court agrees with the Court below that Jackson, 
LaGant and Willie have properly raised the statute of limitations 
defense, then this Court should determine whether such statute is 
unconstitutional in light of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution, the Open Courts Provision. Indeed, even if this 
Court reverses the lower court's decision on the grounds that the 
statute of limitations defense was waived, it should still 
provide some guidance to the lower court as to the 
constitutionality of the statute if the statute of limitations 
defense is ultimately allowed to be raised by amendment. 
The statute of limitations (actually a statute of repose) 
upon which Jackson, LaGant and Willie rely, provides that no 
person can bring an action for personal injury or property damage 
"against any person performing or furnishing the design, 
planning, supervision of construction or construction" of any 
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improvement to real property that may be defective or in a 
dangerous condition, if such action is brought more than seven 
years after the construction is completed. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25.5 (Supp. 1989) . 
In this case, there may be a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether construction of the golf course was ever completed, 
thereby precluding the statute from beginning to run. Willie 
states in his affidavit that he designed the golf course to 
include trees that would be planted between the 14th and 15th 
tees and that construction was never completed. Willie Affidavit 
11 8-9, 12. 
Assuming that there is no issue of fact that the golf course 
was completed by the time it was open for business, then it is 
undisputed that more than seven years have passed since that 
occurred and Plaintiff would be barred from a cause of action 
against Jackson, LaGant and Willie under Section 78-12-25.5. 
Because under Section 78-12-25.5, Plaintiff is denied a remedy 
against Jackson, LaGant and Willie before it even arises, that 
provision is unconstitutional under the Open Courts Provision of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution declares that 
11
 [a] 11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him and his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law . . . ." Utah Const, art. I, § 11. 
Although this Court has never addressed the constitutionality of 
Section 78-12-25.5 under Article I Section 11, it has determined 
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that a similar statute of repose under the Utah Products 
Liability Act is unconstitutional under the Open Courts 
Provision. 
In Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 111 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985) plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against 
the manufacturer of an airplane under products liability 
theories, for defects in the airplane that caused the death of 
their husband and father. The lower court granted summary 
judgment to the defendant manufacturer of the airplane on the 
grounds that the action was barred under Section 78-15-3 of the 
Utah Code, which provided that a products liability action cannot 
be brought more than six years after the product is initially 
purchased or ten years after its date of manufacture. This Court 
reversed the summary judgment and remanded the matter to the 
lower court for trial, holding that the products liability 
statute of repose was unconstitutional under the Open Courts 
Provision. The court then established a two-part analysis for 
determining whether a provision is unconstitutional under the 
Open Courts Provision: 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides 
an injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy "by due course of law" for 
vindication of his constitutional interest. The 
benefit provided by the substitute must be 
substantially equal in value or other benefit to the 
remedy abrogated in providing essentially comparable 
substantiative protection to one's person, property, or 
reputation, although the form of the substitute remedy 
may be different. . . . 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative 
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of 
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action may be justified only if there is a clear social 
or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination 
of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. 
Id. at 680 (citations and footnote omitted). 
Under the first part of the analysis, it appears that the 
substitute remedy contemplated would be something similar to the 
worker's compensation and no fault insurance provisions. Id. at 
677. In this case, the legislature has not developed any 
alternative statutory remedy like worker's compensation or no 
fault insurance that would appropriately compensate a party 
injured by an improvement completed more that seven years prior 
to the injury. 
Jackson, LaGant and/or Willie may argue that Plaintiff does 
have another common law remedy against Southgate, who was the 
owner and occupier of the golf course at the time of Plaintiff's 
injury. That remedy, based upon the authorities cited below, is 
contingent upon Plaintiff proving that the defect or dangerous 
condition in the property was known or should have been known by 
Southgate prior to the injury. Although Plaintiff contends that 
whether Southgate knew or should have known of a defect in the 
golf course is a question of fact and that the lower Court's 
grant of Summary Judgment was improper, there is still some 
likelihood that the trier of fact will ultimately determine that 
any defect or dangerous condition in the golf course was latent 
to Southgate and, therefore, Southgate would not be liable. If 
Section 78-12-25.5 is upheld, then Plaintiff would be 
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effectively denied any remedy whatsoever for her injuries, even 
against the very parties who created the defect and dangerous 
condition. 
The second prong of the Berry analysis is whether there is 
any justifiable legislative purpose behind the statute of repose. 
In Berry, this Court performs an extensive analysis of whether 
the products liability statute of repose is justifiable. That 
analysis is likewise applicable to the builders statute of repose 
at issue here. Based upon that analysis, in this case, as in 
Berry, this Court should determine that Section 78-12-25.5 "does 
not reasonably and substantially advance the stated purpose of 
the statute . . . and whatever beneficial effects may accrue from 
the statute of repose do not justify the denial of the rights 
protected by Article I section 11." Id. at 683. 
One justification for the statute of repose that may be 
offered by Jackson, LaGant and/or Willie, which was not discussed 
in Berry, is that the statute prevents a builder or architect 
from having to defend "stale" claims for improvements that were 
constructed decades previous to the injury. Although that may be 
true, the burden is even greater upon a plaintiff, who must 
prosecute an action based upon a claimed defect that occurred so 
very long ago. Indeed, since Plaintiff has the burden of proof, 
it would appear that a difficulty in obtaining witnesses and 
evidence from decades ago would be more detrimental to Plaintiff 
than to any of the Defendants. The Florida Supreme Court 
rejected such a justification in striking down a builder and 
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architect statute of repose under its open courts provision in 
Overland Construction Co, v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979). 
There, the Florida Supreme Court stated as follows: 
We recognize the problems which inhere in exposing 
builders and related professionals to potential 
liability for an indefinite period of time after an 
improvement to real property has been completed. 
Undoubtedly, the passage of time does aggravate the 
difficulty of producing reliable evidence, and it is 
likely that advances in technology tend to push 
industry standards inexorably higher. The impact of 
these problems, however, is felt by all litigants. 
Moreover, the difficulties of proof would seem to fall 
at least as heavily on injured plaintiffs, who must 
generally carry the initial burden of establishing that 
the defendant was negligent. In any event, these 
problems are not unique to the construction industry, 
and they are not sufficiently compelling to justify the 
enactment of legislation which, without providing an 
alternative means of redress, totally abolishes an 
injured person's cause of action. 
Id., at 574. 
Finally, by holding Section 78-12-25.5 unconstitutional, as 
it did the products liability statute of repose in Berry, this 
Court would not be treading new ground, but would be joining a 
growing number of jurisdictions that have done likewise. See, 
e.g. , Id. ; Say lor v. Hall, 497 S.W. 2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Daugaard 
v. Baltic Cooperative Building Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W. 2d 419 
(S.D. 1984); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 
1980) . 
Based upon the above discussion, this Court should determine 
that Section 78-12-25.5 is an unjustified abrogation of 
Plaintiff's constitutional rights under Article I Section 11. 
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POINT IV 
SECTION 78-12-25.5 IS A CONSTITUTIONAL DENIAL OF EQUAL 
PROTECTION UNDER THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 
The appellants in Berry also argued that the products 
liability statute of repose was an unconstitutional denial of 
equal protection under Article I Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution and the 14th Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Either because it determined that the Open Court's 
Provision was more applicable to the facts at hand or because 
that provision effectively disposed of the case, this Court did 
not address the equal protection argument in Berry. Despite the 
apparent inclination of this Court to at least downplay an eaual 
protection challenge in a case like this, Plaintiff will briefly 
address that issue here. 
Article I section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that 
"[a]11 laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24. Similarly, the 14th amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
law. U.S. Const, amend. 14, § 1. This Court has recently 
construed the application of both of the above provisions in 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) . There, this Court 
struck down as unconstitutional the Utah Automobile Guest 
Statute, deciding the case under Article I section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore this Court did not consider 
constitutional arguments under the Utah due process clause and 
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the Open Court1 s Provision. Id. at 693. In holding the Guest 
Statute unconstitutional under Article I Section 24, this Court 
established the following criteria: 
Article If § 24 protects against two types of 
discrimination. First a law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class. Second, the statutory 
classifications and the different treatment given the 
classes must be based on differences that have a 
reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the 
statute. If the relationship of the classification to 
the statutory objectives is unreasonable or fanciful, 
the discrimination is unreasonable. 
When persons are similarly situated, it is 
unconstitutional to single out one person or group of 
persons from among a larger class on the basis of a 
tenuous justification that has little or no merit. 
Id. at 670-71 (citations omitted). Accordf Condemarin v. 
University Hospital , 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 8-11 (Utah May 1, 
1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 
884f 889-90 (Utah 1988) . 
In this case, it would appear that Section 78-12-25.5 is not 
unconstitutional under the first type of discrimination described 
in Malan. All plaintiffs who have brought a cause of action 
prior to seven years before completion are treated the same and 
all plaintiffs who have brought a cause of action more than seven 
years after completion are treated the same. In other words, it 
is the seven year period from date of completion that determines 
the class into which a particular person falls. Therefore, in 
order for Section 78-12-25.5 to pass constitutional muster, there 
must be some reasonable justification and legislative objective 
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that is fulfilled by the classification. The analysis thus 
becomes essentially the same as in Berry. 
Based upon the analysis in Berry and Malan, the rationale 
for upholding Section 78-12-25.5 is not justified. Additionally/ 
other jurisdictions have determined that statutes of repose 
similar to Section 78-12-25.5 are unconstitutional denials of 
equal protection. See e.g., Shebulia v. Architects Hawaii Ltd.f 
65 Hawaii 26, 647 P.2d 276 (1982); Loyal Order of Moose Lodge 
1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Broome v. Truluck, 
270 S.C. 227f 241 S.E. 2d 739 (1978); Kallas Milwark Corp. v. 
Square D Co.f 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W. 2d 454 (1975). 
POINT V 
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACTf PRECLUDING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AS TO WHETHER SOUTHGATE KNEW OR 
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF ANY DEFECT IN THE GOLF COURSE 
Plaintiff's primary claim of negligence against Southgate is 
that, as the owner of the golf course, it failed to properly 
inspect the premises for defects and dangerous conditions, to 
warn Plaintiff of such conditions and to properly repair and 
maintain the course in a reasonably safe condition. It is clear 
In Condemarin, two justices in the majority expressed some 
dissatisfaction with the equal protection analysis, rather than a 
due process analysis, in determining the constitutionality of a 
governmental immunity provision. Condemarin, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 
5, at 11 (Durham, J., lead opinion), 20-21 (Zimmerman, J. 
concurring in part). On the other hand, the third justice 
concurring in the majority believed the equal protection approach 
to be more appropriate. Id. at 22 (Stewart, J., separate 
opinion). Because of this apparent divergence in the Court, 
Plaintiff has presented for review analyses under both 
approaches. 
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that Southgate has such a duty under Utah case law. Stevens v. 
Colorado Fuel & lrony 24 Utah 2d 214, 469 P.2d 3, 5 (1970); 
Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P.2d 304, 
307 (1955). 
Southgate has further contended that for Plaintiff to be 
able to enforce this duty she must be able to show that Southgate 
either created the dangerous condition or that it had actual or 
constructive notice of it. Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 
339, 431 P.2d 566, 569 (1967). 
In order to affirm the Summary Judgment in favor of 
Southgate, this Court must consider the evidence in a light most 
favorable to Plaintiff and still conclude that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and that Southgate is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 
595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979). In other words, as long as any 
part of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
admissions or affidavits show that there is any genuine issue of 
material fact, summary judgment is not warranted and this Court 
should reverse. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Assuming that the above stated law regarding the duty of 
Southgate is correct, the sworn statements on file with the Court 
establish that there are genuine issues of material fact 
precluding summary judgment as follows: 
1. Did Southgate create a defective or dangerous conditions 
that existed on April 5, 1986? 
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2. Did Southgate know or should it have known of a 
defective or dangerous condition that existed on the golf 
course? 
The first issue of fact will be discussed in Point VI
 f 
below. The lower Court determined that there was no genuine 
issue of fact as to whether Southgate knew or should have known 
of any defect or dangerous condition in the golf course. 
However, the affidavits establish that there is an issue of fact 
as to whether Southgate had actual or constructive notice. 
A. Actual Notice. 
Plaintiff's expert stated in his affidavit that he believed 
there was a defect in the design and/or construction of the golf 
course, because of the proximity of the 14th and 15th tees 
2 
without a natural or artificial barricade between them. 
Further, Mr. Rainville stated that such defect existed on the 
date of the accident, April 5, 1986. Therefore, a reasonable 
inference would be that the defect could have been caused by the 
modifications made to the 14th hole by Southgate itself, after 
its purchase from Lava Hills but before the accident. Therefore, 
if Southgate created all or a portion of the defect, it must have 
had actual notice of it. 
Obviously, according to Mr. Rainville, it would have been 
unnecessary for an artificial or natural barrier if hole 15 had 
been shortened to obviate the danger caused by the proximity of 
the tee boxes. 
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B. Constructive Notice, 
Considering the Affidavit of Mr. Rainville in a light most 
favorable to Plaintiff, this Court must assume that there was a 
defect in the golf course as of April 5, 1986. In their 
affidavits, both Richard Schmutz and William Atkin state that 
fl[t]he layout of the course as it existed at the time of 
Plaintiff's accident was patent and easily observable by any 
person playing the course. Additionally, a person preparing to 
tee off on the 15th hole would have previously played the 14th 
hole and would be familiar with the proximity and location of the 
two tees." Schmutz Affidavit M 8-9; Atkin Affidavit M 7-8. If 
the layout and condition of the course was so observable to 
Plaintiff, then it should have been even more observable to 
Southgate, who owned and operated the course on a daily basis. 
Therefore, Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue as to whether 
Southgate should have known of a defect in the course that they 
had been operating and even modifying during the past 11 months. 
Finally, the lower Court had already determined that any 
defect, assuming one existed, "could have been discovered by 
Defendant Southgate through such an inspection as would be made 
in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence." Findings 1 10. 
Hence, it would appear that the lower court's own rulings as to 
constructive notice are inconsistent. If the lower court is not 
even sure in which direction to go, it would appear that there is 
at least a genuine issue of material fact. 
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POINT VI 
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER 
SOUTHGATE CREATED A DEFECT OR DANGEROUS CONDITION 
ON THE GOLF COURSE, WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURY 
Even assuming the lower court was correct in determining 
that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Southgate knew or should have known of any defect in the golf 
course, that court should have not granted judgment as a matter 
of law because there was still an issue as to whether Southgate 
created a defective or dangerous condition. 
As stated above, Mr. Rainville has stated that, in his 
opinion, there was a defect in the golf course as of April 5, 
1986. April 5, 1986 was after Southgate had performed various 
modifications to the 14th hole. Yet, even after those 
modifications, the golf course was still defective. By its 
modifications of the 14th hole, Southgate thus at least 
contributed to creating the unsafe condition of the golf course 
on April 5, 1986. Whether Southgatefs contribution to the 
condition of the golf course gives rise to its liability is, 
therefore, a genuine issue of material fact. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the lower Court as to the Summary 
Judgments of all Defendants and remand the case for trial before 
the trier of facts. If this Court is inclined to reverse the 
Summary Judgment in favor of Jackson, LaGant and Willie on the 
grounds that they have waived the statute of limitations defense, 
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such reversal should be with directions to the lower Court that 
Section 78-12-25.5 is unconstitutional under the Open Courts 
and/or Equal Protection Provisions of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^O^ day of July, 1989. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
&%#£ fa &^— 
FLOYDGW HOLM 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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P l a i n t i t f , 
4BERLA1N 
IEYS AT LAW 
O U T H M A I N 
. BOX 7 2 6 
•AR CITY. 
H 84720 
5 8 6 - 4 4 0 4 
v s 
IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE 1, d/b/a 
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA 
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation; REX JACKSON; 
JOHN LaGANT; and JOHN WILLIE, 
Defendants, 
SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
i i \ 
Plaintiff, for cause of action against Defendants, alleges 
as follows: 
1. r< * - • . - - . - * '.omas") i s an 
TCaVjLa^v.. !<_.:,;:<;.:M I: >- .1 <. ;ie County, Idaho. 
2 . Defendai - unknov J i - - :^T;. 
par tn*; ! - : ! i ' - : •; as f u!..:«u.-i' U^,I;: 
Cour se > i R i r i i i u i t e i "Sou t l iqat e" * ' - ' i . t hga t e has *~r, p r i n c i p a l 
p l a c e '*t 1 usinfts.1 - - V - K : ^ ^ ^ ^ m i * '** Mursuann. v- '" 
° ' . 'Qu:e, . l,ia.::txff r e s e r v e s t h e 
;i . ' • u b s u r t u t e * Lc * r*;e nan* t Ichr. Dot1 * :* :-ucti t ime as 
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3. At ail times pertinent herein, Defendant Lava Hills 
Resort Corporation (hereinafter "Lava Hills") was a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with 
its principal place of business in Washington County, Utah. 
4. Upon information and belief, Defendants Rex Jackson, 
John LaGant and John Willie (hereinafter "Lava Hills 
individuals") are individuals residing in Washington County, 
Utah. 
5. The accident that is the subject of this accident took 
place in Washington County, Utah. 
6. Plaintiff, at all times pertinent herein, was a business 
invitee of Southgate. 
7. At all times pertinent herein, the Lava Hills 
individuals were officers, employees or agents of Lava Hills, 
acting within the course and scope of such employment or agency. 
8. On or about April 5, 19 86 at approximately 12:15 p.m., 
Plaintiff was standing on the tee-box of the 15th hole of the 
golf course owned and operated by Southgate in St. George, Utah. 
9. At the same time and place, Thomas was on the tee-box 
of, upon information and belief, the 14th hole of the same golf 
course, which was approximately 50 to 75 yards southwest of 
Plaintiff. The 14th hole was a temporary hole being used during 
modification of the golf course. 
10. Immediately thereafter, and while Plaintiff was still 
standing on the 15th tee, Plaintiff hit a golf ball from the 14th 
tee in a northerly direction, the ball sliced to the right and, 
AZ. 
w i t h o u t w a r n i n g from Thomas, s t r u c k P l a i n t i f f < >n ! In ; , ioo , 
c a u s i nc ' * _ . . • , . . 
^s .-. l e s u i t : * lie- . i n c i d e n t , " . \ l a i n t i : : u s t a i n e d 
i r n u r i e n f a c e , ~ n c l u d i i i y , o u r 
:.oro: •. 
he a c c i d e n t and injur ic-f • . : a i n t i i f r e s u l t e d from 
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 he f o l l o w i n g a c t s o i noqi i r j f 'n ' " ' •"• ' i. >: 
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 :; < :o l t t a 1.: • *ic(. r p r o p e r 
h i t t i n g • • • • •
 K: \;^\,:^\ \ ; i r s * 
<ibr( : : . i : : : ::n +-hat .t ^uwl«: be done s a f e l y anc wi thout in ju ry 
' o t h e r s , ; n c l u d i n g P l a i n t i - : ; ind 
- _: : * be go3f b a l l 
travelling m I icuntiii *r, direciior «o that Plaintiff could 
tak* appropriate precautions lor nei L^4<»-
: -* : \'<omas were a proximate cause of 
a_;t; ^l . i , u: T ; < : 
I 'IT*- accident tnc 
^encc *i4) t ; :t_ pari ol ^'uuihcate: 
la; -.ilowjnq . : :• patrons * * * the t emporary 
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(c) Failure to warn its business invitees, including 
Plaintiff and Thomas, of the danger posed by the close 
proximity of the tees for the 14th and 15th holes; and 
(d) Failure to take other appropriate precautions for 
the safety of its business invitees, including Plaintiff. 
15. The negligent acts of Southgate were a proximate cause 
of Plaintiff's injuries. 
16. The accident and injuries to Plaintiff resulted from 
the following acts of negligence on the part of the Lava Hills 
individuals and Lava Hills by and through the Lava Hills 
individuals: 
(a) Failure to safely design the golf course to 
prevent injury to the general public, including Plaintiff. 
(b) Failure to safely construct the golf course so as 
to prevent injury to the general public , including 
Plaintiff. 
(c) Failure to inform Southgate and/or its other 
successors in interst of latent defects it knew or should 
have known existed on the golf course, which could cause 
injury to the general public, including Plaintiff. 
17. The negligent acts of the Lava Hills individuals and 
Lava Hills were a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. 
18. As a proximate result of the negligence of all 
Defendants, Plaintiff has incurred hospital and medical expenses 
in an amount in excess of Eight Hundred Eighty Five Dollars 
($885.00) and sustained physical pain and mental anguish. 
A4 
"1 f-. • i3 anticipated that Plaintiff wil'1 sust^ir rhvsical 
' '— - <- * • . • i - • • u:ure
 f 
: :;OL : or the remainder ot her life. By reason • the 
negligence of Defendants, Plaint:' r l:as been damaged generally 
'} lousand D< • _;r. • : ,0 00 . 00) 
Laintiff has incurred, medical and hospital, expenses 
and will continue to do so uu- •: :•<*; ih^ ' . * -
i n an amount to be proven at L.JIO time of trial • i -.the: 
appropriate hearing. 
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1. For special damages, including medical expenses and lost 
income, together with interest thereon as may be determined by 
the Court at the time of trial; 
2. For future special damages, including medical expenses 
and lost income, the exact amount of which is unknown at this 
time, but for which may be determined by the Court at the time of 
trial; 
3. For general damages in the sum of $50,000.00; 
4. For costs of this action; and 
5. For such other and further relxef as the Court deems 
just and proper. 
DATED this o?/-~-day of C/07V0*+- , 1988. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
^)XT4^~-
FLOYD W£pOLM 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
1885 Pelican Lane 
West Yellowstone, Montana 59758 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand delivered a full, true and 
correct copy oi ' }\<- loroaoino SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT to each of 
the follow mi • nn ' , | i i.it.;H]<! l v! I ly prepaid on this 
/xb- day !•: October, i9oh: 
Richard i.. Ciauc^i 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendant Southgate 
Golf Course 
4 Triad Center, Suite 0 0 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Paul Grafr Esq. 
Attorney for Defend 
94 West Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah R 
Terry L. Wade, Esq. 
SNOWf NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE 
Attorney for Defendant Rex Jackson 
9 0 East 200 North 
P.O. Box 400 
S t . G e o r g e , Ut.ili J HI ' 0 
T imothy B . A n d e r s o n 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOl 
249 E a s t T a b e r n a c l e 
S u i t e 200 
S t . G e o r q r , 111 an M 1 
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FIFTH DiSTRICT COUw.-
W A £ H - - - : ; • : ; COUNTY 
' 8 7 OCT 28 Fin 9 SM 
CLERK 
WENDELL E. BENNETT nF PI IT Y~~^?)/PflfA*M>«J 
Bar License #0287 u t 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Defendant Thomas 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801-532-7846 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CORY KLATT, 
Plaintiff. 
vs 
AFFIDAVIT OF VERN THOMAS, 
aka IKE THOMAS 
Civil No. 86-1116 IKE THOMAS and JOHN DOE I, 
dba SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE, 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
VERN THOMAS, ALSO KNOWN AS IKE THOMAS, being first duly 
sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That he is one of the defendants above named. 
2. That he makes this affidavit of his own knowledge. 
3. That on the 5th day of April, 1986, he was playing golf 
at the Southgate Golf Course in St. George, Utah. In conjunction 
with that game of golf, he hit a tee shot from the 14th tee box, 
intending the ball to go toward the 14th green. 
4. That the tee shot from the 14th tee box did not go dir-
ectly toward the green, but sliced, which is something that occa-
sionally occurs to right handed golfers, and immediately after I 
AL 
hit the shot, one of the members of my golfing party, namely, Bob 
Johnson, i nxmediateh7 hollered "fore" at the earliest moment it 
: . . •- • . .: .:•* i.ji: was slicing to the r:;ii;; . 
dso -jaw the bal. J at abo\ . rhe same time ! heart: "\ . 
.
;ohnson h-^! I vr " ?oro" . it Lak11ly ^ • c: t: j € r i * :)d ' 
LL'ie i n g t : .)i * ;^> .. .1 *. , a f t e r T c o m p l e t e d my s w i n g , .^nd r ^ a i : .. j_ii>i 
t h e b a 11 w a s s i i c i nr, t o r i i i 1 h r ' *'Wa ? 11 * - e . - o x . s o 
- ^ ! 1 . * f - r e d 
: . a i i w a s a p p r o a c h i u e t a e n c o i h n ; i s s i b i y p o s e a h a z a r u • •) 
t h e m . 
6 . ' . * - • . * . : • • • • i » i » . e 
s t a n d i n g ••• ;:<• * * * : t e e box <>: * h r r r ivr- n rrv • >e s h o t i-i t h a t 
( d i r e c t i o n a s q u i c k ! v a^ v,;<- h u m a n L- ? w>ssLbi<= u; h o l l e r i n g " f o r e " 
w h e n a - * n o s e s .. d a n g e r 
i n v o m 'All * ' 
U JLU H U L l U L e i H ' 1 
i r o n , t-> . , . 1 0 ^ , a n ^ T wqs a.ir, ; U H G I I <_ . 
: w e v e r . . v;i ] ] s o m e t i m e ? * ,:< u r . * h e 
t r a v e l e d i n t h - } i -
a d i a c e n t t n f-lu- .-« 5
 J L i u - n w a v .-.IM 
. i e*-
a l ^ 1 I c e o •^ t h e i iiMir a n d 
e ] y 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITl I NOT, 
nATFh f 11 i j i J / l V 0 d U>^M<^ , 19 8 7 • 
/J-^ >t. /VdW* 
VERN THOMAS 
-3-
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
COUNTY OF BLAINE ) 
VERN THOMAS, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
says that he is the defendant above named, that he has made and 
read the foregoing affidavit and knows the contents thereof; that 
the same is true of his own knowledge, except as to matters therein 
stated upon information and belief, and as to such matters, 
believes them to be true. j 
I 
> W . / JI / - ,(9-y^^d^CL 
VERN THOMAS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to b e f o r e me t h i s / ^ day of (p^T^-*'-^ , 
1987 . 
My C o m m i s s i o n / E x p i r e s 
.Ftri DioiRICTCOUR 
.V!."*: OOUNr 
Timothy B. Anderson of 
JONES, .WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDON* 
Attorneys for Defendant Lagant 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801) 628-1627, 
r.{ 
DEPUTY 
EN" THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT-COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF; UTAH 
.—-oooOooo—-
CORY ,t«.I.A"i"i
 l( 
Plaintiff, 
vs» 
I K E T H Q M A S A N D J 0 H N D 0 E j^ 
DBA SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
TOHN LAGANT 
ui j
 v i 1 N o . '" h" ' ' '• 
o o o 0 o o o 
STATE OF Ci/<i'r/"« 
County of >u 
:er 
3 . 
C o r p o r a t e , 
(now " S o u t h g a t r " 
Defendant m e abuve ^aj ~ a c t : , 
r e s i d e n t o t ^SlJt/U'DAtJ , Ooyr>^/^C 
M nqjiMij', i;^ v*iloped the 
M V S : 
^J KX L. 1J> C" 
Corporate: :; I terminated my atfilidti ..i . *. ^ i. I respect.. **' * ..* 
golf course ** • • -s* ^a^i'^. 
5. "* 
Southgate ,! . .r*,o's Answers to Interrogatories in: Requests i ui 
Production ui bocuments dated September .•, 1'J87. Ine Answer — 
/ i / / 
Interrogatory No* 4 sets for the modifications to the golf course 
with respect to the 14th and 15th holes where the alleged injury 
to plaintiff occurred. 
6. The modification involved the movement of the 14th green 
in October, 1985, and the abandonment of the original 15th green 
in February, 1986, with attendant construction activity in the area 
until October, 1986, 
7. I neither authorized nor had any knowledge of or 
involvement whatsoever in the modification, design or construction 
work referred to in Plaintiff's complaint, and more specifically, 
described in the Answer to Interrogatory No. 4 referred to above. 
DATED this L? day of.dra^ watesr, 1988. 
JMN V. LAGANT 
. / / / • 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6? day of November, 
1988 
•L„l- cAoct 
Notary Public 
Res id ing i n : JTAIC/^O , C/9 
My Commission Expires:' 
C:\LAGANT\Affidavit 
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County o1 ^ V ^ /?SjJ^ . J 
"i'i fhti .....Ig? day of— .# btfora ma# tha undat 
;ua*l, • Nnlaiy Public In and for laid County and Stata, paaonaUy *pp**t*<l—<7^7fY |/- / / ? • < > / » A / / " 
pnawafly known to ma (»f pcovad to ma on tha basis of satisfactory avWanoa) to ba th t 
xvhosa nama... „ . „ £ . - * l i - . „ tubccribad to this Instrumant %(\6 acknowtadoad that 
apacaon 
axacuttd It. n i i * * * * **i.« - - - o ^ * * * ! * * * * ; * ^ * * - : * * * * * * * * * 
»
 > - T^x orr!crAL s r-AL 5 
jfrlTNESSmy hand and of1n III stai ^ 
A 
J'JO! 
r"L:?;..*;' /,, ^ ••'j '- -*:*. ;M lf 
j / / d : / \fy {/<<'<-<^ _ ; t^\on j . . i .^!cn Dpucr. r^y 10. 1CS9 J 
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CO-IS . 
76 
/4B 
PAUL F. GRAF #1229 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT JOHN WILLIE 
P.O. BOX 1637 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84765 
(801) 628-2757 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
CORY KLATT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IKE THOMAS; John Doe I dba 
Southgate Golf Course; Lava 
Hills Resort Corporation, 
a Utah Corporation; Rex Jackson; 
John LaGant; and John Willie, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN WILLIE 
Civil No. 86-1116 
) 
) ss 
) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
John Willie, being duly sworn upon his oath deposes and 
says : 
1. That I am a defendant in the above-entitled action. 
2. That I have personal knowledge of the facts set 
forth herein and am competent to testify. 
3. That I was an officer and shareholder in Lava Hills 
Resort Corporation at the time of its incorporation in 
December of 1975. 
4. That on July 1, 1976, I resigned as an officer of 
the Lava Hills Resort Corporation, but remained as a small 
stockholder in Lava Hills Resort Corporation. 
5. That as my contribution to the corporation, in order 
t o ',uai.: ; v 'J e c o m e a s 11;11 t• inj : .i •i i :i • 11 . > ...: \ :: • i i s 
G o l f C o u r s e w i t h t h e aid of .Join: L a G a n t , goil p r o . 
6 . T h a t : ' • p r e r a r J ;i ,a t h o o o I f r i: r : e d o s i ^ n , • n e v e r at 
any t i m e artc-j a * n- c a p a c r , . • i i a >. a - p *. - n c on t '*ontractor, 
7 , . i a t ' ^ a s n e v e r p a i u ,; f L \ \i o a * • \ 'l i a M I i h i l l s f o i 
a i 1 y w o r I : ••:.:! e ., 
8 . . .idi. < c « J Hi in e IHI e a t . i i M s c a p i u K . . l o n g , i I 1 : a J I w a y s on 
ti l e n o r t h end L _ "_he g o l f _ o u r s e , i n c l u o 1 n 0 ' h ^ .*!• a:;.] * * , 
1 i o 1 e s . 
9. That as of July 1 i°76, -he Lava Hills Golf Course 
war- r ^ * '"inlete, specificali} ^ ^ ^.^^ — « ^v.,. »oles were 
hat :. u , i s i. o t ! , • >1 . e .j * 
manae^": ea: r t h e c o u r s e at L u e L 
C o r p o r a t i o n d a r i n * • . i r v "f-M trnctJi 
oust r u c t i o n or 
l:u J OS :nt i < i >. • i : J i i i ., g \ > J I >,uar b e . 
1
 * * .i nd sr a p l n v u as . . «M 
n • i c s a s I i c-i c i.imenu ed 
a a f Rex J a r k s o r. i! 
; a • - r 
., e s o r t 
; ;a c e a i t e r 
I i 
1 mi * :.. 
h e 
- s i g n e d . 
>i t i 1 i t • * M M I d i ng 
a , : « i < J J1 t " , i u L - V C b i * U i : M b L i i t V I i i 
o p e r a t i o n s <* f : he - . o i l - <»in :- i* r< <• <I • s s 'i s t fi na e i *i a e s i ga . i I a e 
/f/6" 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT 
DATED th: lis MJk day of August, 1988 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ ^ 
/2^<^xx^T , 1988. 
day of 
My Commission Expires: ^ 6 l ^ ^ K / ^ ' * 
Nota ry P j ib l i c 
R e s i d i n g a t : f t j ^ g £ y < ^ 
Certificate of Mail: 
ta lYtf M. SUTTERF1ELD •; 
'^^JhfW E.6fob. St. Geov UT 84770 
"9 
^x*'' my comm. expires. 5-24-1992 
I hereby certify that on the J-j day of August, 1988, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of John Willie to 
to each of the following by -cre~posin 
~i+a4-l-T—p-rr^ rH^  gp pre-paid, nridrrs nW— t t r : 
Floyd W. Holm, Esq. 
Chamberlain & Higbee 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Richard K. Glauser, Esq. 
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Terry L. Wade 
Kory D. Staheli 
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake 
90 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
copy, in juh-o-^ r-S ic. '4/s ^ ^ 
r-c - Ai 
PAUL F. GRAF #1229 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT JOHN WILLIE 
P.O. BOX 1637 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84765 
(801) 628-2757 
jp! G:T i c e : Iji 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
CORY KLATT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IKE THOMAS; John Doe I dba 
Southgate Golf Course; Lava 
Hills Resort Corporation, 
a Utah Corporation; Rex Jackson; 
John LaGant; and John Willie, 
Defendants. 
CO-DEFENDANT JOHN WILLIE'S 
RESPONSE TO CO-DEFENDANT 
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE'S 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civxl No. 86-1116 
COMES NOW Co-defendant John Willie by and through Paul 
F. Graf, his attorney of record in the above captioned matter 
and responds to Co-defendant Southgate Golf Course's requests 
for admissions as follows: 
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 1: Admit thac you designed the 
Lava Hills Golf Course. 
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 1: John Willie admits 
that he designed the Lava Hills Golf Course with the 
assistance of John LaGant. 
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that at the time you 
designed the Lava Hills Golf Course, you were acting as an 
independent contractor. 
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 2: John Willie denies 
that he ever worked as an independent contractor in relation 
Sj 
to his activities with Lava Hills Golf Course. 
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that the' Lava Hills Golf 
Course was built by Rex>Jackson« 
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 3: John Willie 
believes that Rex Jackson built the Lava Hills Golf Course. 
John Willie does admit that Rex Jackson had the 
responsibility to see that the golf course was built. 
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that Rex Jackson built 
the Lava Hills Golf Course according to your designs. 
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 4: John Willie denies 
that the Lava Hills Golf Course was built according to all 
his designs and recommendations. His plan may have been used 
as a guide, but his specific recommendations for holes 14 and 
15 were not followed in every aspect. 
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that the Lava Hills Golf 
Course remained unchanged and unmodified until it was sold 
and the name changed to the Southgate Golf Course. 
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 5: John Willie has no 
basis to admit or deny this request. He disassociated 
himself with the golf course on July 1, 1976, prior to the 
completion of the course, more particularly, prior to the 
completion of holes 14 and 15. He does not know the 
condition of the golf course when it was initially completed 
or the condition at the time of sale. 
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that the Lava Hills Golf 
Course as originally designed was not defective. 
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 6: John Willie admits 
that the Lava Hills Golf Course as originally designed was 
not defective, 
ADMISSION REQUEST NO, 7: Admit that the Lava Hills Golf 
Course as originally built was not defective, 
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO, 7: John Willie has no 
knowledge of the conditions of the originally completed golf 
course, but admits that if his plans and recommedations were 
followed, then the Lava Hills Golf Course as originally built 
was not defective, 
ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that the modifications to 
the 14th green" made by the Southgafe Golf Course increased 
the angle of play on the 14th hole away from the 15th tee 
area. 
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO, 8: John Willie has no 
knowledge of the initially completed 14th hole and 15th tee 
or modifications later made. 
ADMISSION REQUEST NO, 9: Admit that the modification 
referred to above, made the course safer than when originally 
constructed . 
RESPONSE TO ADMISSION REQUEST NO. 9: John Willie has no 
knowledge of the modifications made to the 14th hole and 15th 
tee . 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CORY KLATT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE I dba 
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA 
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation; REX JACKSON; 
JOHN LaGANT; and JOHN WILLIE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AFFIDAVIT OF REX 
JACKSON 
Civil No. 86-1116 
Rex Jackson, being duly sworn upon his oath deposes and says: 
\. That \ am a defendant in the above action. 
2. That I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and am 
competent to testify. 
3. That I was an officer and shareholder in Lava Hills Resort Corporation from 
the time it was incorporated in December of 1975, until May of 1985 when I sold my 
shares to Southgate Goti Course. 
4. That I had nothing to do with creating a design for the Lava Hills Golf 
Course. 
1 
5. That the golf course was designed by John Willie. 
6. That John Willie designed the Golf Course in the capacity of an independent 
contractor. 
7. That John Willie had complete control over designing the Lava Hills Golf 
Course. 
8. That I have exercised no control whatsoever over the golf course from the 
date I sold my shares in the corporation to Southgate, and specifically, that I had no 
control over the course in April of 1986. 
9. That after Southgate purchased the golf course, it changed the location of 
the 14th green/hole, as well as the direction of the 14th tee box. 
10. That in April of 1986, the 14th green/hole was in a different location than it 
was in when the golf course was owned by Lava Hills, and furthermore, the direction 
or angle of the 14th tee box was materially different as of the said date than it had 
been during the ownership of Lava Hills. 
11. That during the approximately 10 years the golf course was owned and 
operated by Lava Hills, there were no major accidents on the golf course, and 
specifically none involving the 14th and 15th holes. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this / $- day of < ^ * y , 1988. 
EX JACKSON^ R SOr 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / £ ^ ~ day of 
J 1988. 
My Commission Expir 
llUkj 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of August, 1988, I served a copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF REX JACKSON on each of the following by 
depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Floyd W. Holm, Esq. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Richard K. Glauser, Esq. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Secretary 
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LOWELL V. SMITH, #3006 
RICHARD K. GLAUSER, #4324 
HANSON, DONN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorney for: Defendant 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
!H DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
'87 OCT 6 PH 1 2S 
CLERK 
DEPUTY2^________: 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CORY KLATT, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
IKE THOMAS and JOHN DOE I, 
dba SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD SCHMUTZ 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 86-1116 
Richard Schmutz, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. At the time of the incident underlying plaintiff's 
Complaint, affiant was a part-owner of the defendant, Southgate 
Golf Course. 
2. The affiant has not only owned a golf course but 
also golfs regularly and is familiar with typical golf course 
rules, etiquette and procedure. 
DESIGN OF GOLF COURSE 
3. The defendant, Southgate Golf Course, purchased the 
grounds in May of 1985. The defendant did not design, construct 
/IZ5 
or in any way create the golf course. Affiant is informed and 
believes that the golf course was created in or near the 
mid-1970s and was designed and constructed by the prior owners, 
Rex Jackson, John LaGant and John Willie, as agents of the prior 
owner, Lava Hills Resort Corporation. The course was designed 
and constructed long before any affiliation with the course 
existed with defendant, Southgate Golf Course. 
MODIFICATIONS TO THE COURSE 
4. From the time the defendant purchased the golf 
course until the accident described in plaintiff's Complaint, 
only one modification was made to the golf course. This 
modification was to move the 14th green approximately 130 feet to 
the northwest. This modification was made approximately during 
the first two weeks of October, 1985. The effect of this change 
was to make the 15th tee, where plaintiff was allegedly standing 
at the time of the accident, further away from the line of fire 
of patrons on the 14th hole. The reason for the damage was not 
concern that previous alignment was too close to the 15th tee (it 
had played that way 7 years without incident). The reason was 
sale of land that took the original 14th green. The new green 
was closer to the tee and made a shorter #14 3-par hole, and it 
was further out of the line of fire from the 15th tee. 
NO DEFECT 
5. Since affiant became affiliated with the Southgate 
Golf Course, thousands of patrons played the course as it 
-2-
appeared at the time of plaintiff's accident. Thousands of 
patrons also played the course as it existed prior to the 
modification described above which lessens any danger to patrons 
on the 15th tee area. Of all the players that played the course, 
affiant is not aware of any other complaints regarding players on 
the 15th tee being struck or threatened by balls hit by patrons 
from the 14th tee area. 
6. Affiant believes that the course as it existed at 
the time of plaintiff's accident did not create an unreasonable 
risk to patrons besides the risk inherent in the game of golf. 
7. The 15th tee is not in the line of fire of patrons 
playing the 14th hole. At the time of plaintiff's accident, the 
15th tee center was approximately 253 feet to the northeast of 
the 14th tee. The 15th tee was approximately 160 feet to the 
right of the line of fire of the 14th tee. The 15th tee was 
approximately 40 degrees to the right of the line of fire from 
the 14th tee to the 14th green. 
ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
8. The layout of the course as it existed at the time 
of plaintiff's accident was patent and easily observable by any 
person playing the course. 
9. Additionally, a person preparing to tee off on the 
15th hole would have previously played the 14th hole and would be 
familiar with the proximity and location of the two tees. 
-3-
10. The game of golf inherently contains the risk that 
golf balls will not travel precisely in the intended course. 
Players are aware of these risks and should be alert to the 
potential of straying golf balls. Additionally, golfers are 
required to give adequate warnings to other endangered players by 
reasonably shouting "fore" when a shot may endanger another 
player. 
DATED this /fr & day of September, 1987. 
RICHARD SCHMUTZ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
RICHARD SCHMUTZ, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and says that he is a representative of the defendant above 
named? that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and knows the 
contents thereof? that the same are true of his own knowledge, 
except as to matters therein stated upon information and belief, 
and as to such matters, believes them to be true. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me 
this jfv P day of September, 1987. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: U ~~ 1 - *"! 1 
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LOWELL V- SMITH, #3006 
RICHARD K. GLAOSER, #4324 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A P r o f e s s i o n a l C o r p o r a t i o n 
A t t o r n e y f o r : Defendan t 
650 C l a r k Learning O f f i c e Cen te r 
175 S o u t h West Temple 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 363-7611 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CODRT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CORY KLATT, 1 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IKE THOMAS and JOHN DOE I, 1 
dba SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE, ] 
Defendants. 1 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM ATKIN 
) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR. 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 86-1116 
William Atkin, being first duly sworn upon oath/ 
deposes and says: 
1. The affiant is currently the superintendant for the 
defendant/ Southgate Golf Course* Prior to May of 1985, he 
worked as the course superintendant for the prior owner, The Lava 
Hills Resort Corporation. Prior to May of 1985, the grounds were 
referred to as The Lava Hills Golf Course. He has been employed 
and has worked on that course since October of 1981. 
DESIGN OF GOLF COURSE 
2. The defendantf Southgate Golf Course, purchased the 
grounds in May of 1985. The defendant did not designf construct 
or in any way create the golf course. Affiant is informed and 
believes that the golf course was created in or near the 
mid-1970s and was designed and constructed by the prior ownersf 
Rex Jackson, John LaGant and John Willie, as agents of the prior 
owner, Lava Hills Resort Corporation. The course was designed 
and constructed long before any affiliation with the course 
existed with defendant, Southgate Golf Course. 
MODIFICATIONS TO THE COURSE 
3. From the time the defendant purchased the golf 
course until the accident described in plaintiff's Complaint, 
only one modification was made to the golf course. This 
modification was to move the 14th green approximately 130 feet to 
the southwest. This modification was made approximately during 
the first two weeks of October, 1985. The effect of this change 
was to make the 15th tee, where plaintiff was allegedly standing 
at the time of the accident, further away from the line of fire 
of patrons on the 14th hole. In essence, this change made it 
less likely that patrons on the 15th tee would be in or near the 
line of fire from players on the 14th hole. 
NO DEFECT 
4. Since affiant became affiliated with the Southgate 
Golf Course, thousands of patrons played the course as it 
//ZV 
appeared at the time of plaintiff's accident. Thousands of 
patrons also played the course as it existed prior to the 
modification described above which lessens any danger to patrons 
on the 15th tee area* Of all the players that played the coursef 
affiant is not aware of any other complaints regarding players on 
the 15th tee being struck or threatened by balls hit by patrons 
from the 14th tee area. As the course superintendant for almost 
six years, affiant would generally be apprised of any danger to 
patrons while playing the course. 
5. Affiant believes that the course as it existed at 
the time of plaintiff's accident did not create an unreasonable 
risk to patrons besides the risk inherent in the game of golf. 
6. The 15th tee is not in the line of fire of patrons 
playing the 14th hole. At the time of plaintiff's accident, the 
15th tee center was approximately 253 feet to the northeast of 
the 14th tee. The 15th tee was approximately 160 feet to the 
right of the line of fire of the 14th tee. The 15th tee was 
approximately 40 degrees to the right of the line of fire from 
the 14th tee to the 14th green. 
ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
7. The layout of the course as it existed at the time 
of plaintiff's accident was patent and easily observable by any 
person playing the course. 
8. Additionally, a person preparing to tee off on the 
15th hole would have previously played the 14th hole and would be 
familiar with the proximity and location of the two tees. 
,7^ / 
9. The game of golf inherently contains the risk that 
golf balls will not travel precisely in the intended course. 
Players are aware of these risks and should be alert to the 
potential of straying golf balls. Additionally, golfers are 
required to give adequate warnings to other endangered players by 
reasonably shouting "fore" when a shot may endanger another 
player. 
DATED this day of September, 1987. 
WILLIAM ATKIN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF ) 
WILLIAM ATKINr being first duly sworn on oathf deposes 
and says that he is a representative of the defendant above 
named; that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and knows the 
contents thereof; that the same are true of his own knowledge, 
except as to matters therein stated upon information and belief, 
and as to such matters, believes them to be true. 
WILLIAM ATKIN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me 
this day of September, 1987. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
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FLOYD W HOLM [1522] 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CORY KLATT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IKE THOMAS and JOHN DOE I, 
d/b/a SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DAVID A. RAINVILLE 
Civil No. 86-1116 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ORANGE ) 
I, DAVID A. RAINVILLE, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
depose and say as follows: 
1. I am a resident of the State of California with offices 
in Tustin, Orange County, California. 
2. I am presently self-employed as a designer anc 
consultant for the design of golf courses. 
3. I have 25 years experience as a golf course designer. 
4. I have personally designed or participated in the design 
of over 30 golf courses. 
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5. I am a member of the American Society of Golf Course 
Architects and have been for five years. 
6. The American Society of Golf Course Architects is an 
exclusive society. Membership is only granted after the golf 
course designer has designed at least five golf courses and has 
been judged by his peers to be a competent and expert golf course 
architect. 
7. In my experience as a golf course designer anc 
architect, I have been called upon and required to determine anc 
insure that golf courses are designed for the maximum safety oi 
those who would play on the golf course. 
8. I have been qualified as an expert witness in thre* 
unrelated court matters and have testified therein concerning th< 
safety of the design of various golf courses. 
9. I have been requested by Plaintiff in the above-entitle< 
action to render my expert opinion regarding the adequacy of th< 
design and warnings of Defendant's golf course on or about Apri 
5, 1986. 
10. I have relied upon the following information to rende 
my opinions: 
(a) Copies of the deposition transcripts of Mrs. Cor 
Klatt and Mr. David Klatt. 
(b) An aerial photograph with topographical marking 
of the entire golf course, which was taken prior to April 5 
1986. 
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(c) An irrigation plan for the golf course dated 
December 18, 1975. 
(d) An engineerfs drawing of the fourteenth hole and 
fifteenth tee, which was prepared on or about March 27, 
1987-
(e) Various photographs of the fourteenth tee and 
green and fifteenth tee of the golf course taken by 
Plaintiff's counsel in October, 1987. 
Copies of all of the above-referenced materials with the 
exception of the depositions of Mr. and Mrs. Klatt, have been 
attached hereto as Exhibits "A" through "K" and are incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
11. Based upon the above information and upon my expertise 
and experience as a golf course designer and architect, I have 
formed an opinion as to the adequacy and safety of the design and 
warnings concerning the use of the Southgate Golf Course, whether 
such inadequacies, if any, were negligent on the part of 
Southgate Golf Course and whether such negligence, if any, was a 
cause of Mrs. Klatt fs injuries. A copy of a report outlining my 
findings and conclusions and expert opinion on the above stated 
issues is attached hereto as Exhibit "L" and incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
DATED this £p -* day of February, 1988 
"^~->w\ A; DAVID A. RAINVIELE 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this S -
February, 19 88. 
day of 
ARYPU1 
P4ko 
My Commission Expires: 
OFFICIAL SEAL 
CASPER P. HARE 
NOTARY PUBLIC - C A L J F O R N I A 
PRINCIPAL OFFlCf IN 
ORANGE COUNTY 
My Commission Exp. Feb. 5, 1989 
NOT  PUBLIC 
Residing a t : 
fu/>-h^,Go. «UfeS° 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID A. RAINVILLE to Mr. Lowell V. 
Smith and Mr. Richard K. Glauser, HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH, 
Attorneys for Defendant Southgate Golf Course, 650 Clark Leaminc 
Office Center, 175 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; 
and to Mr. Wendell E. Bennett, Attorney for Defendant Ike Thomas, 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; b} 
first class mail, postage fully prepaid on this day o: 
February, 1988. 
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David I \ainvi 
golf course architect 
100 W Main St. 
Tustin, CA 92680 (714)838-7200 
February 2, 1988 
Floyd W. Holm 
Chamberlain & Kigbee 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 726 
250 South Main 
Cedar City, Utah 34720 
RE: Klatt v. Southaate Golf Course 
Dear Mr. Holm: 
I have received the material you provided regarding the fourteenth and 
fifteenth holes of the Southgate Golf Course. 
The engineer's mapping of the fourteenth hole and the fifteenth tee 
compares favorably with ttie aerial photograph provided. I checked 
the scale of the maps against indicated distances on the plot map 
shown on the engineer's drawing and known standards such as the 
tennis courts shown in the photo. I feel confident that my measure-
ments of holes and tees are reasonably accurate, particularly for 
the determination of adequate separation. 
The following are answers to your specific questions stated in your 
letter of November 9, 1987. The questions are restated Tor ease of 
comprehension. 
1. Q. Was the golf course, as it existed on April 5, 1986, negli-
gently designed such that it created an unreasonable hazard to 
the safety of persons using the golf course? 
A. In my opinion, the proximity of the fifteenth tee to the center-
line of the fourteenth hole is inadequate and not in keeping with 
safe design standards. My measurements indicate a mere 116 feet 
from the edge of the fifteenth tee to the centerline of the four-
teenth hole. This creates an unreasonable hazard to the persons 
using the fifteenth tee. 
-1 - cAnidH L EXHIBIT 
MEMBER AMERICAN SOCIETY OF GOLF COURSE ARCHITECTS 
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Feb. 2, 19 
2. Q. Could the golf-course have economically erected a fence, 
screen, natural barrier or other appropriate barrier between 
the fourteenth and fifteenth tees to prevent injury to golfers? 
A. The photographs show;, a complete absence of trees separating 
holes fourteen and fifteen. Trees are a very economical method 
of providing a safety and psychological barrier. Two baffle 
fences on the right side of number fourteen tee, one at the front 
and one slightly beyond the first one, and fencing of the right 
side of fifteen tee could also have been provided. A third 
solution would be to simply relocate the fifteenth tee by shorten-
ing the hole slightly. Any two of these solutions are well 
within economic reason. 
3. Q. Was it feasible for the golf course to provide warning signs, 
warning instructions or other appropriate warnings as to the 
danger posed by the proximity of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
tees? 
A. In my opinion, warning signs or instructions are not accept-
able solutions and should only be used as supplemental aides to 
more positive and physical solutions. > 
4. Q. Were Mrs. Klatt's injuries caused by the negligence of the 
golf course in any one or all of the foregoing respects? 
A. My opinion stated in answer to question number one applies 
to this question in the respect that holes number fourteen and 
fifteen were not designed to safe standards nor were corrective 
measures taken in the way of protective fencing and the plant-
ing of trees to alleviate the unsafe conditions created by im-
proper separation of the holes in question. 
In my opinion, the relationship of holes fourteen and fifteen are 
unsafe by design and that a hazardous condition existed for players 
on the fifteenth tee. 
I would further state that reasonable and economical measures could 
have been taken in the way of fencing and planting or relocation of 
fifteen tee to correct the design deficiencies. In my opinion, the 
design and lack of safety features contributed to the injuries 
experienced by Mrs. Klatt. 
Respectfully yours, t 
David A. Rainville 
DAR/sb 
encs. 
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From the 14th tee northeasterly toward the 14th green 
EXHIBIT E 
From the 14th tee northeasterly toward the 15th tee. 
EXHIBIT F 
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From approximately 50 yards behind the 14th tee (next 
to the road) showing both the 14th green and 15th tee. 
EXHIBIT G 
From the 15th tec southwesterly toward the 14th tee. 
/M 
EXHIBIT H 
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-ass; 
From the 14th tee northeasterly toward the 15th tee 
with a person standing in approximate location of Mrs. 
Klatt on the 15th tee. 
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EXHIBIT I 
From approximately 50 yards behind the 14th tee (by the 
road) showing both the 14th green and 15th tee, with a 
person standing on the 15th tee. 
EXHIBIT J 
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From the 14th tee northeasterly toward the 14th green 
with a person standing on the 14th green. 
EXHIBIT K 
^ • E J S E J J T 
From approximately 50 yards behind the 14th tee (by the 
road) showing both the 14th green and 15th tee, with a 
person standing en the 14th green. 
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TERRY L WADE -A 3882 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE 
A Professional Corporation 
90 East 200 North 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, Utah 84770 
801/628-1611 
File #532501/BJ3 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CORY KLATT, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ] 
IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE I, dba ] 
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA 
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION, ] 
a Utah Corporation; REX JACKSON; 
JOHN LaGANT; and JOHN WILLIE, ' 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
REX JACKSON'S MOTION 
I FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 86-1116 
Defendant Rex Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment came on before 
the Court on Wednesday, the 21st day of December, 1988. Appearing at the 
hearing were Thomas M. Higbee, representing the Plaintiff, Cory Klatt; Terry L. 
Wade, representing the movant/Defendant, Rex Jackson; Timothy B. Anderson, 
representing Defendant, John LaGant; and Paul Graf, representing Defendant, 
John Willie. Defendants Southgate Golf Course and Ike Thomas neither appeared 
by counsel nor in person; however, Plaintiffs counsel adopted and argued the 
position of Defendant Southgate Golf Course as set forth in the latter's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Rex Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court first considered the "Objection to Notice of Hearing" filed by 
counsel for Defendant Southgate Golf Course respecting Defendant Rex 
Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court determined that proper and 
1 
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adequate notice of the hearing had been given, and that the hearing on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment couid, therefore, go forward. 
The Court then considered Plaintiffs counsel's oral objection to the 
timeliness of Defendants John LaGant's and John Willie's motions to join in the 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Rex Jackson. The Court determined 
that said joinder motions were untimely and that the Motion for Summary Judgment 
could go forward only as to Defendant Rex Jackson. 
The Court then heard oral argument from counsel relative to Defendant Rex 
Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment and, having reviewed the Memorandum 
of counsel and the pleadings, affidavits and other material on file with the Court, 
determined that there was no just reason for delaying the entry of final judgment as 
to Defendant Rex Jackson. 
NOW, THEREFORE, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant Rex 
Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same is, granted dismissing 
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, as it relates to Defendant Rex Jackson, 
and further, dismissing Defendant Southgate Golf Course's Cross-Claim against 
Defendant Rex Jackson. The Court finds, as the basis for its Order, the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff, Cory Klatt, was injured as the result of an accident 
which occurred on April 5, 1986, while Plaintiff was playing golf at the Southgate 
Golf Course in St. George, Utah. That the said accident occurred when 
Defendant, Ike Thomas, aiming for the fourteenth green, sliced a shot from the 
fourteenth tee area and struck Plaintiff, who was standing in the fifteenth tee area. 
2 
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2. That at the time of the accident involving Plaintiff, Defendant 
Southgate Golf Course (hereinafter "Defendant Southgate") was the owner of the 
golf course and had complete possession and control thereof. 
3. That Defendant Southgate had purchased the subject golf course 
approximately eleven months prior to the accident involving Plaintiff, in May, 
1985, from Defendant Lava Hills Resort Corporation (hereinafter "Defendant Lava 
Hills"). 
4. That Defendant Rex Jackson (hereinafter "Defendant Jackson") had 
been an officer and shareholder in Defendant Lava Hills from the time of its 
incorporation on or about December 9, 1975, until the sale to Defendant 
Southgate in May, 1985, at which time he sold his entire interest in the golf course 
to Defendant Southgate, and the latter purchased the remaining assets of 
Defendant Lava Hills. That since the time Defendant Jackson relinquished his 
interest in Defendant Lava Hills and in the golf course in May, 1985, he has not 
exercised any control whatsoever over the golf course. 
5. That although the Southgate Golf Course (originally known as Lava 
Hills Golf Course) was originally designed and constructed during the ownership 
of Defendant Lava Hills, soon after purchasing the golf course, Defendant 
Southgate sold the particular segment of the golf course property whereon the 
original fourteenth hole, as designed and constructed during Lava Hills' 
ownership, had been located, and in October of 1985, constructed a new 
fourteenth hole approximately 130 feet to the Northwest. 
6. That the acts of negligence alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint involved 
the new fourteenth hole designed and constructed by Defendant Southgate and 
the existing fifteenth hole of the golf course. 
7. That on the date of the accident the fourteenth hole of the golf course 
was in a different location than the fourteenth hole as constructed during 
3 
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Defendant Lava Hills' ownership and as shown on the original design maps for the 
Lava Hills Golf Course, it having been changed by Defendant Southgate in 
October of 1985. Furthermore, the direction or angle of the 14th tee box was 
materially different on the date of the accident than it had been during the 
ownership of Defendant Lava Hills. 
8. That at the time of the accident, neither Plaintiff nor Defendant 
Thomas were following the original design and construction of the golf course as it 
had been when it was under the control of Defendant Lava Hills, at least with 
respect to the fourteenth hole. 
9. That during the approximately ten years the golf course was owned 
and operated by Defendant Lava Hills, there were no major accidents on the golf 
course, and specifically none involving the fourteenth or fifteenth holes. During 
those approximate ten years the fourteenth and fifteenth holes were located 
according to the golf course's original design and construction. While under the 
control of Defendant Lava Hills, the fourteenth hole was never in the location it 
was in on April 5, 1986, the date of the accident. 
10. That even if the fourteenth and fifteenth holes of the subject golf 
course, as designed and constructed during the ownership of Defendant Lava 
Hills, were defective or unsafe at the time Defendant Southgate purchased the golf 
course (and this Court makes no such finding at this juncture), such defect could 
have been discovered by Defendant Southgate through such an inspection as 
would be made in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, and Defendant 
Southgate had a reasonable time to discover and remedy any such defect or 
dangerous condition prior to the occurrence of Plaintiffs accident. 
11. That Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Rex Jackson (hereinafter 
"Defendant Jackson") of negligence in the design of the golf course is barred 
under the doctrine of Res Judicata in that: 
4 
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(a) said claim involves the same parties as it did when it was 
previously raised in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint; 
(b) the Court entered a final judgment on the merits as to this claim 
against Defendant Jackson when it granted Summary Judgment in an 
Order dated September 6, 1988; and 
(c) the said prior adjudication involved the same claim of 
negligent design against Defendant Rex Jackson as that presently 
raised in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. 
12. That the Court's "Order Granting Summary Judgment," dated 
September 6, 1988, aforedescribed, was a final adjudication on the merits in that it 
did expressly determine that there was no just reason for delay in entry of final 
judgment as to Defendant Jackson, as required by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant Jackson is entitled to Summary Judgment, dismissing, 
with prejudice, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, as it relates to him, and 
further, dismissing, with prejudice, Defendant Southgate's Cross-Claim against 
him. 
2. Defendant Jackson's entitlement to Judgment, as aforenoted, is 
based upon the general rule of law, which is stated thus in the Restatement 
Second of Torts, Section 352: 
Except as stated in Section 353, a vendor of land is not subject to 
liability for physical harm caused to his vendee or others while upon 
the land after the vendee has taken possession by any dangerous 
condition, whether natural or artificial, which existed at the time that 
the vendee took possession. 
The exceptions to this general rule, as noted in Section 353, Restatement Second 
of Torts, do not apply under the facts of this case. 
5 
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3. As a further legal basis for Defendant Jackson's entitlement to 
Judgment, as aforenoted, the Court adopts the reasoning set forth in the case of 
Preston v. Goldman. 42 Cal.3d 108, 227 Cal.Rptr. 817 (1986), and deems said 
case to be dispositive hereof. 
MADE AND ENTERED this 5&~day o f ^ ^ ~ ~ c ^ 
BY THE COURT: V 
, 198_2L-
District Court Jaage 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 1988, I served 
an unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT REX 
JACKSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. 
Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Floyd W. Holm, Esq. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HlGBEE 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Richard K. Glauser, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
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Paul F. Graf, Esq. 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Timothy B. Anderson, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 ,
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
hereby certify that on the / ^ day of < ^ 
1989, I served a signed copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
REX JACKSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on each of the following by depositing a copy in 
the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Floyd W. Holm, Esq. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Richard K. Glauser, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Paul F. Graf, Esq. 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Timothy B. Anderson, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
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SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE 
A Professional Corporation 
90 East 200 North 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, Utah 84770 
801/628-1611 
File #532501/BJ3 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CORY KLATT, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE I, dba ) 
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA 
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION, ) 
a Utah Corporation; REX JACKSON; 
JOHN LaGANT; and JOHN WILLIE, ) 
Defendants. ) Civil No. 86-1116 
Defendant Rex Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment came on before 
the Court on Wednesday, the 21st day of December, 1988. Appearing at the 
hearing were Thomas M. Higbee, representing the Plaintiff, Cory Klatt; Terry L. 
Wade, representing the movant/Defendant, Rex Jackson; Timothy B. Anderson, 
representing Defendant, John LaGant; and Paul Graf, representing Defendant, 
John Willie. Defendants Southgate Golf Course and Ike Thomas neither appeared 
by counsel nor in person; however, Plaintiff's counsel adopted and argued the 
position of Defendant Southgate Golf Course as set forth in the latter's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Rex Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court, having heard oral argument from counsel and having considered and 
reviewed the memoranda of counsel, as well as the pleadings, affidavits, and 
other material on file with the Court, and having heretofore made and entered its 
1 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and thus being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that no just reason 
exists for delaying the entry of final judgment as to Defendant Rex Jackson, and 
therefore, the tatter's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted dismissing, 
with prejudice, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, as it relates to Defendant Rex 
Jackson, and further, dismissing, with prejudice, Defendant Southgate Golf Course's 
Cross-Claim against Defendant Rex Jackson. 
DATED this of C\*^^*~> 198_2_. 
CJ2^&X— 
J.^HILIP EVE! 
fstrict Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 1988, I served 
an unsigned copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT on each of the 
following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 Floyd W. Holm, Esq. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Richard K. Glauser, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Paul F. Graf, Esq. 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Timothy B. Anderson, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Secretary 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 1^ day of c jieJ^UiMM^-—, , 
1989, I served a signed copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT on each of 
the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed 
to: 
Floyd W. Holm, Esq. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Richard K. Glauser, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Paul F. Graf, Esq. 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Timothy B. Anderson, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBBOOK & MCDONOUGH 
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Secretary 
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LOWELL V. SMITH, #3006 
RICHARD K. GLAUSER, #4324 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CORY KLATT, 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UNDER-
Plaintiff, LYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE I, dba 
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA 
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation; REX JACKSON; 
JOHN LAGANT; and JOHN WILLIE, Civil No.: 86-1116 
Defendants. J Judge J. Philip Eves 
Plaintiffs motion to vacate the summary judgment 
entered in favor of Rex Jackson, defendant John Willie's motion 
for summary judgment, defendant John LaGant's motion for summary 
judgment, and plaintiff's request for oral argument on defendant 
Southgate's motion for summary judgment all came on regularly for 
hearing on the 6th day of February, 1989. Plaintiff was 
represented by counsel, Floyd W. Holm. Rex Jackson was 
represented by counsel, Terry L. Wade. Defendant, John Willie, 
was represented by counsel Paul F. Graf and David L. Watson. 
:E«-J. ,•J/^jjc77/^-U^ 
A St. 
Defendant, John LaGant was represented by cbunsel Timothy B. 
Anderson. Defendant Southgate was represented by counsel, 
Richard K. Glauser. The court having reviewed all memoranda, 
affidavits and other relevant documents on file and having heard 
argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, now 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF REX JACKSON 
1. The action against Rex Jackson is barred by the 
statute of repose for injury due to defective design or 
construction of improvements to real property contained in 
Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The actions against Rex Jackson failed to state a 
cause of action based upon the principal set forth in Preston v. 
Goldman, 77 P.2d 476 (Cal. 1986). 
3. There are no grounds to vacate the summary judgment 
previously entered in favor of Rex Jackson, 
JOHN WILLIE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. The action against John Willie is barred by the 
statute of repose for injury due to defective design or 
construction of improvements to real property contained in 
Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2 
2. The actions against John Willie failed to state a 
cause of action based upon the principal set forth in Preston v, 
Goldman, 77 P.2d 476 (Cal. 1986). 
3. John Willie is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
JOHN LAGANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. The action against John LaGant is barred by the 
statute of repose for injury due to defective design or 
construction of improvements to real property contained in 
Section 78-12-25-5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The actions against John LaGant failed to state a 
cause of action based upon the principal set forth in Preston v< 
Goldman, 77 P.2d 476 (Cal. 1986). 
3. John LaGant is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
SOUTHGATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. Pi 
pursuant to Rule 2.8(gJ 
and Ci 
MC 
I i. Plaintiff has failed to show any evidence that 
defendant knew or should have known of any defect on the golf 
course. 
%&-. Southgate is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. * 
DATED this ^^ day of ~2U^l^c^ , 1989. 
3LE J. BHILIP EVES 
Lstrict Couiw: Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, this \~1 day of March, 1989, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing, to the following: 
Floyd W. Holm 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
250 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Terry L. Wade 
Kory D. Staheli 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE 
90 East 200 North 
P. 0- Box 400 
St. George, Utah 84770 
David L. Watson 
650 East 500 South 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Paul F. Graf 
P. O. Box 1637 
St. George, Utah 84770-1637 
Timothy B. Anderson 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
249 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Original mailed to; 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT CLERK 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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LOWELL V. SMITH, #3006 
RICHARD K. GLAUSER, #4324 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ggZSSv 
CORY KLATT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IKE THOMAS; JOHN DOE I, dba 
SOUTHGATE GOLF COURSE; LAVA 
HILLS RESORT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation; REX JACKSON; 
JOHN LAGANT; and JOHN WILLIE, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 86-1116 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
Plaintiff's motion to vacate the summary judgment 
previously rendered in favor of Rex Jackson, defendant 
John Willie's motion for summary judgment, defendant 
John LaGant's motion for summary judgment, and a request for oral 
argument on defendant Southgate's motion for summary judgment, 
all came on regularly for hearing on the 6th day of February, 
1989, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves. Plaintiff was 
represented by counsel, Floyd W. Holm. Defendant, Southgate Golf 
Course, was represented by counsel, Richard K. Glauser. 
^VJ 
Defendant, John Willie, was represented by counsel, Paul Graf and 
David L. Watson. Defendant, Rex Jackson, was represented by 
counsel, Terry L. Wade, Defendant, John LaGant, was represented 
by counsel, Timothy B. Anderson, 
The court having read and reviewed all of the pleadings 
relevant to the respective motions and having heard argument from 
all counsel of record and being fully advised in the premises and 
having previously entered its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, now; 
HEREBY ORDERS as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's motion to vacate the summary judgment 
rendered in favor of defendant, Rex Jackson, is hereby denied, 
2. Defendant John Willie's motion for summary judgment 
is hereby granted; 
3. Defendant John LaGant's motion for summary judgment 
is hereby granted; 
4. Defendant Southgate's motion for summary judgment 
is hereby granted. 
5. The court notes that defendant, Ike Thomas, has 
previously settled in entirety with the plaintiff and the 
plaintiff agreed to give to all other parties credit for the 
amount paid by defendant, Ike Thomas, or the percentage of 
negligence attributable to Ike Thomas, if any, whichever is 
2 
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greater. Therefore, the complaint against Ike Thomas and any and 
all other cross-claims against Ike Thomas are hereby dismissed. 
6. The court notes that defendant, Lava Hills Resort 
Corporation, has not ever appeared or otherwise been subject to 
the jurisdiction of this court. 
7. Since this order disposes of all claims with regard 
to all parties over which this court has jurisdiction, the trial 
date of March 9 and 10, 1989, is moot and is hereby vacated. 
Likewise, Southgate's motion to compel and motion in limine 
regarding insurance are moot and the court makes no determination 
thereon. Although this court is not aware of any pending claims 
regarding parties within the jurisdiction of this court which are 
not disposed of by this order, the court expressly finds that 
there is no just reason for delay and that this order shall 
become final upon entry pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. A 
DATED this ~Z day of flA^^-^O*^ , 1989. 
a^st4— 
ORABLE J. PHILIP EVES 
xstrict Courty Judge 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, this ^1^^" day of February, 1989, a true and correct 
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P. 0. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Terry L. Wade 
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT CLERK 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
KLATT.SJ 
4 
